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Abstract
Why people don’t behave as disaster risk management practitioners and policy 
makers would expect in times of crisis is often attributed to what are perceived 
to be ‘commonsensical’ explanations such as lack of access to information, 
lack of analytical skills, capacity or resources, or poor judgement based on 
misinformation. This paper challenges the ‘commonsensical’ and contributes to a 
growing body of research which argues that Disaster Risk Management (DRM) fails 
to pay adequate attention to the underlying assumptions that presume certain 
behaviour will result from the implementation of a DRM policy or programme. 
Focusing on contributions from social psychology to better understand what 
motivates, influences or steers the behaviour of individuals, this paper seeks 
to introduce disaster risk managers to new concepts that they may not have 
otherwise come across. Structured around the themes of emotions, unrealistic 
optimism and previous experience, the concepts introduced in the paper 
include territorial functioning, unrealistic optimism, memory bias, evaluability 
and risk compensation. The paper includes a consideration of some of the 
methodological limitations of the research presented under these three themes, 
the implications for DRM, and conclusions, which point towards the need for a 
greater consideration of the role of culture in DRM. These concepts, it is hoped 
can provide insight into better understanding why people don’t behave as we 
would expect.
What does the role of culture mean for  Climate Smart  
Disaster Risk Management?
There has been substantial academic interest in the role of culture in relation to 
disasters and climate change. There has been less focus on the intersection of 
culture with climate change and disasters, not least because the two communities 
are at an incipient stage in understanding what the Disaster Risk Management 
(DRM) and climate change nexus looks like in practice. The Climate Smart Disaster 
Risk Management (CSDRM) approach is at the forefront of this thinking and the 
consideration of culture provides new insight into a complex set of issues. 
Our cultural backgrounds and contexts significantly influence the way we think 
and act and thus is inseparable from all stages of the development process. 
What tends to be the focus of discussions on culture is the culture of those 
communities we are trying to help. For the Strengthening Climate Resilience (SCR) 
programme, culture is recognised as an important component of understanding 
a context in which CSDRM may be applied and implemented.  In the guidance 
to operationalising CSDRM (Harris et al., 2011), this involves understanding 
communities’ values, priorities and ways of being. However, even with recognition 
of the need to take culture seriously, this is not easy: not least because culture is 
inherently complex and difficult to analyse objectively, but also because there are 
further challenges in trying to analyse one’s own culture. It is not the intention to 
explore the debates regarding the methodological validity of who is best placed to 
study culture here - an insider or outsider, for example - but important to note that 
such debates exist. What can be highlighted here is the recognition that cultural 
influences are an important and intractable part of any context within which 
CSDRM may be applied, influencing interpretations of risk and disaster and factors 
such as memory and motivation. 
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1. Introduction
Disaster risk management (DRM) practitioners and policy makers have been 
grappling with this challenge: whilst their efforts to reduce disaster risk can 
and do save millions of lives and livelihoods across the globe, the risks they 
are trying to address are largely downplayed by the communities they work 
with, coming relatively low down on their list of priorities. With climate 
change set to increase the frequency, intensity and also the unpredictability 
of some natural hazards, disaster risk being a low priority is likely to 
become a more urgent problem. Compounding this is the reality that, in 
many situations, those at risk do not behave as the DRM sector would 
expect, or would like, individuals to behave.
Why people don’t behave as disaster risk reduction practitioners and 
policy makers would expect in times of crisis is often attributed, in part, 
to what are perceived to be ‘commonsensical’ explanations such as lack 
of access to information, lack of analytical skills to know what to do with 
that information, lack of capacity or resources to take action, or poor 
judgement based on misinformation. The ‘logical’ solution to address these 
issues is improved DRM: more sensitisation, training, or improved manuals 
and toolkits. In contrast to much of the literature, this paper doesn’t seek 
to understand how to ‘make’ people behave as we would expect, i.e. by 
framing this as a problem for disaster risk managers in the sense that 
there is a failure to communicate or enact the ‘appropriate’ risk reduction 
behaviour. Instead this paper seeks explanations for why people don’t 
behave in the way we would expect and the implications of the current 
framing of preparedness and response to disaster risk as employed by the 
DRM sector. 
Unless the DRM sector recognises that the mainstream framing of disaster 
risk (which is in itself negotiated, contested and by no means homogenous) 
fails to pay adequate attention to the underlying assumptions that presume 
certain behaviour will result from the implementation of a programme, 
DRM will be left wanting. There will continue to be a disconnect between 
what Cannon (2008) refers to as ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, referring to 
recipient communities (insiders) and people from organisations external 
to the recipient community who are implementing DRM interventions 
(outsiders), and the continuation of the interpretation that DRM 
programmes are failing to achieve the intended outcomes, when in fact 
there are more fundamental and complex issues at play. Furthermore, this 
challenge will be compounded as climate change adds new pressure on the 
DRM sector to deal with situations and scenarios beyond their previous 
experience; not forgetting that climate change brings with it a whole new 
complex milieu of cultural understandings, interpretations, scepticism, 
challenges and priorities.
The aim of this paper is to introduce disaster risk managers to new 
concepts that they may not have otherwise come across, such as territorial 
functioning, unrealistic optimism, memory bias and risk compensation. It 
is hoped this will provide stimulus for policy makers and practitioners to 
explore the relevance of these concepts in their own contexts and, in doing 
so, provoke new ways of approaching, framing and thinking about DRM. 
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This paper thus contributes to the growing body of literature from both the 
disasters and climate change sectors which reveals a much more complex 
and nuanced understanding of why people don’t behave as we would 
expect (for examples, see Bankhoff, 2003; Shipper, 2010; Whitmarsh, 2008).
1.1. Background to the paper and a caveat from the author
This paper stems from a growing recognition of the significance of culture 
in DRM within academic and practitioner circles. In July 2011, the author 
attended the ZiF Research Group workshop in Bielefeld, Germany, on the 
topic ‘Cultures and Disasters’. Coupled with findings from the Strengthening 
Climate Resilience (SCR) programme (that this paper contributes to), this 
provoked a more thorough focus on the role of culture in both disasters 
and climate change. In line with the SCR programme approach, this 
paper employs interdisciplinary thinking. The paper seeks to deepen our 
understanding of complex issues around the significance of culture for 
DRM to inform future work dealing with the impacts of climate change, in 
order to actively seek ‘intelligence’ beyond our usual frames of reference, 
disciplinary backgrounds and sectoral specalisms.
This paper focuses on social psychology as one of many possible ways of 
applying a new lens to better understand what motivates, influences or 
steers the behaviour of individuals. It is a discipline that is largely ignored in 
mainstream DRM. It is necessary to point out that the author does not have 
a background in social psychology but nonetheless attempts here to unpack 
the relevance of social psychological literature for others that are unfamiliar 
with the discipline’s potential contributions to disaster risk research.
What is presented in this paper draws on a desk-based review of selected 
academic literature. It does not present a full and thorough literature 
review, nor does it cover all the possible contributions from the field 
of social psychology in relation to disaster risk research or the topics 
of interest to this paper including emotions, unrealistic optimism and 
previous experience. The intention is to present relevant literature which 
may encourage wider engagement with aspects of social psychology that 
are highly relevant to DRM, but often overlooked and thus fail to inform 
disaster risk reduction programming and policy making. 
Social psychology has much to offer in terms of thinking about why people 
behave in certain ways in disaster situations. A limitation, as readers will 
notice, is that research has been predominantly based on Western case 
studies: the relevance and application of social psychology findings to 
other contexts should therefore be treated with some caution. Moreover, 
the methods employed by the discipline to understand behaviour contrast 
quite substantially to those conventionally used in the disaster sector. 
In order to take account of this, a section of this paper is dedicated to 
methodological issues. Despite these limitations, three topics explored 
largely by social psychologists in the context of disasters have been chosen 
for discussion in this piece because of their relevance to DRM: emotions, 
unrealistic optimism and previous experience.
In the next section the paper explores the role of emotions, unrealistic 
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optimism and previous experience, followed by a consideration of some 
of the methodological limitations of the research presented under these 
three themes. In the third section the implications for DRM are discussed, 
followed by conclusions which point towards the need for a greater 
consideration of the role of culture in DRM. 
2. Emotions, unrealistic optimism and previous  
     experience
2.1. The role of emotions
‘People are likely to spend less time picturing the affective consequences of 
an improbable event than the affective consequences of a probable event’ 
Siegrist and Gutscher (2008: 772)
Increasingly, researchers have been calling for a greater consideration of 
the role of emotions in risk research and in particular the role of emotions 
in disaster preparedness. This is an area of study more common to post-
disaster situations, where a great deal of research has been conducted on 
the psychological effects of disasters1. Growing empirical research suggests 
that both perceptions of risk and preventative behaviour are influenced by 
the emotions of past experiences (see Slovic et al., in Siegrist and Gutscher, 
2008: 772). Undertaking research on severe floods in August 2005 in 
Switzerland, Siegrist and Gutscher (2008) identified emotions as one of the 
most influential factors affecting preparedness. 
Their findings point to the ability of those previously affected by floods 
to recall the negative emotions associated with the experience, thus 
motivating them to take preventative action. In particular, the ability 
to recall feelings of uncertainty and insecurity were most influential. 
Conversely, those not affected by experiences of floods rarely cited 
negative emotions, such as fear and helplessness (emotions that were cited 
frequently by those affected) as consequences of a flooding experience 
(Wagner 2004, in Siegrist and Gutscher 2008: 776).
Understanding the role of emotions is important not only for a better 
understanding of why people may or may not take the initiative to become 
better prepared for disasters, but also to shed light on why seemingly 
well thought out preparedness campaigns fail to take effect. Moreover, 
the study of emotions raises fundamental questions about how we, as 
researchers, frame the ‘problem’ of irrationality. Harries’ study (2008) of 
ineffective flood preparedness campaigns and the continued presence of 
unprepared UK citizens in flood risk areas provides an effective illustration. 
Harries’ (2008) research in the flood prone areas of the UK explores not 
only the question of why people are failing to protect themselves despite 
knowing they are in a flood risk area, but ‘why it can seem better not 
to protect yourself’. Using Malsow’s (1943) hierarchy of motivation – a 
conceptual framework that seeks to demonstrate how individuals prioritise 
some categories of emotions over others – Harries (2008: 3) seeks to 
demonstrate that ‘...the rejection of flood-risk mitigation measures - and 
1 Associated with, for 
example, post traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD)
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indeed, of the whole discourse of flood-risk mitigation... can be seen as 
entirely rational’. In short, a better understanding of individuals’ own 
motivational priorities can reveal that the refusal to prepare for floods 
is in fact rational. For the at-risk communities within the UK, the failure, 
or refusal, to undertake flood risk mitigation measures reflects a rational 
desire to prioritise their conception that the home is a safe place, that 
society will protect you and that nature is benign (Harries, 2008: 20). This 
is what Giddens (1991) refers to as ontological security, which individuals 
are placing above their physical security: ‘Preferring to think of their 
homes as places that are innately safe, they reject the idea of defending 
them’ (Harries, 2008: 2). The UK government’s relatively ineffective flood 
prevention campaigns could thus be improved by a greater consideration 
of the role of emotions. For example, reducing the uncertainty surrounding 
mitigation measures by stating exactly what people need to do rather than 
providing options could reduce the likelihood of individuals becoming 
anxious about which measures to take.
Calling into question the decision-making choice of individuals at risk 
of disasters is not confined to the issue of preparedness. Indeed, Raid, 
Norris and Ruback (1999) use people’s experiences of Hurricane Hugo 
and Hurricane Andrew in the United States to explore why people do 
not evacuate when it would seem ‘logical’ to do so. Their findings are 
somewhat inconclusive, leading the authors to stress that behaviours in 
relation to disasters remain largely unexplained. However, they do make 
the interesting point that individuals’ decisions  not to evacuate resulted 
in a large number of victims being ‘directly traumatized by the fury of 
the storms’ (Raid et al., 1999: 929). Actions in one disaster may not only 
affect the individuals’ emotions in relation to that particular event but also 
affect their behaviour, choices and emotions (particularly levels of fear) in 
subsequent disasters.
Fear is an emotion pertinent to the experience of disasters. Fear is 
incredibly powerful and has been shown to influence people’s behaviour 
and attitudes to disaster preparedness. Siegrist and Gutscher (2008: 
777) for example found that ‘...people with flood experience stated more 
often that fear of flood damage was an important factor in implementing 
preventative measures’. Similarly it is the fear of looting hat has been 
identified as deterring people from evacuating in the event of technological 
disasters (Perry, 1985, in Riad et al., 1999). 
Riad et al. (1999: 920) link this to the concept of ‘territorial functioning’, 
which they define as ‘...an interlocking system of sentiments, cognitions, 
and behaviours that are highly place-specific, are socially and culturally 
maintained’. Put another way, emotions play a determining role in 
provoking action to defend one’s territory and protect property and 
possessions. Emotions therefore must not be viewed in isolation but in 
relation to a range of other influencing factors, such as property ownership. 
In this example, territorial functioning is linked to feelings associated with 
ownership and thus more likely to be experienced those who own their 
own home or have lived in places for longer periods of time (Riad et al., 
1999: 920). Interestingly, this is related to another set of socio-cultural 
patterns such as personalising the home, placing signs and barriers up and 
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marking ones territory. But what does this tell us about emotions in relation 
to disaster preparedness? Unfortunately, yet again there are no easy 
answers. Neither the length of residence nor level of property ownership 
could be consistently linked with better understanding the likelihood of 
individuals evacuating (Baker, 1979, in Riad et al., 1999: 920). 
2.2. Unrealistic optimism
‘Unrealistic optimism’ is a useful concept for understanding why people 
behave in ways that contrast with the culture of preparedness encouraged 
by DRM policy makers and practitioners. The concept has received 
most attention in the field of social psychology but has much to offer in 
furthering our understanding of what can make for effective DRM.
An example of unrealistic optimism in practice is in Sattler, Kaiser and 
Hittner’s study of disaster preparedness for hurricanes within the USA 
(2000).2  Their research took place in Charleston, South Carolina, which 
experienced a class four hurricane in 1989, causing what at the time was 
the most damage, measured financially, as the result of a natural hazard 
in the history of the USA. Charleston has since been threatened by four 
hurricanes, all of which changed course at the last minute. The research 
looked at the preparedness of individuals for two of these ‘near misses’; 
Hurricane Emily (September 1993) and Hurricane Fran (September 1996). 
The findings identified that the psychological distress resulting from 
Hurricane Hugo impacted on people’s preparation for Hurricane Emily, but 
not for Hurricane Fran. Why? Amongst the reasons Sattler et al. (2000: 
1414) propose to explain this is the length of time between the hurricanes: 
four years between Hugo and Emily, seven years between Hugo and Fran. 
The preparedness witnessed for Hurricane Emily could be attributed in 
part to the reasons discussed in the previous section; being able to recall 
negative emotions associated with a disaster experience. But why then did 
the level of preparedness diminish by the time Hurricane Fran appeared? 
Sattler et al. (2000) sought alternative explanations and attribute this to the 
7 year break between Hurricane Hugo and Fran which resulted in distress 
symptoms ‘...diminishing over time’; being ‘...less accessible cognitively’; and 
‘...less readily activated by appropriate stressor cures’. They suggest that 
‘memory biases’ may have formed over time, affecting people’s perceptions 
of previous events and thus their decisions on preparedness. But perhaps 
more significantly Sattler et al. (2000) suggest that the change may be 
reflective of unrealistic optimism.
Examples of unrealistic optimism are commonplace, with sayings in the UK 
such as ‘it won’t happen to me’ or ‘lightening never strikes twice’. Yet this 
is not just a matter of downplaying the possibility of being affected by a 
disaster through everyday language. Psychologists suggest that unrealistic 
optimism may have two contrasting effects: a) previous experience can act 
as a coping mechanism by helping to reduce anxiety because there will be 
some level of understanding of what may come, or b) unrealistic optimism 
may deter people from taking preparedness or precautionary measures by 
downplaying the possibility of a disaster or the possible effects of a disaster 
(Burger and Palmer, 1992, in Sattler et al., 2000: 1415). These two effects 
2 Sattler et al. (2000) 
draw on two theoretical 
models. The first model 
is the ‘conservation 
of resources stress 
model’, which predicts 
psychological stress as 
a result of a reduction in 
resources. The second 
is the ‘warning and 
response model’ which 
argues that three factors 
(situational, personal 
characteristics and social 
contextual variables) 
influence perceptions of 
threat and the resultant 
protective actions.
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will be explored in turn. 
First, the assertion that anxiety may be reduced as a result of having 
experienced a disaster previously and thus an individual will ‘know what 
to expect’: as Sattler et al. (2000: 1415) found, people who experienced 
disasters more than once may become ‘inoculated’ to certain psychological 
distress symptoms by their previous experience. Similar findings were 
also evident in survivors of rural Kentucky floods who experienced fewer 
symptoms of anxiety when faced with a new flood (Norris and Murrell, 
1988, in Sattler et al., 2000: 1415).
Second, the assertion that the experience of a disaster may actually prevent 
or deter people from taking precautionary measures: unrealistic optimism 
in this regard is furthered by people’s experiences of ‘false alarms’ or 
‘near misses’. This was the case for the aforementioned communities of 
Charleston who felt that, since the devastation of Hurricane Hugo in 1989, 
the fact that they had experienced four subsequent ‘near misses’ supported 
a false sense of security and even luck, thus deterring preparedness action 
(Sattler et al., 2000). 
Unrealistic optimism was also evident within the communities of Auckland, 
New Zealand, who undertook relatively little preparedness measures 
despite the likelihood of volcanic eruptions. Furthermore, individuals 
would perceive themselves to be less vulnerable in comparison to others 
within their community. As Paton, Smith, Daly and Johnston explain in their 
study (2008: 182), ‘...in doing so, people transfer risk to others within their 
community rather than accepting this risk themselves. If all members are 
making similarly biased assumptions about the distribution of risk within a 
community, no change in either the level of perceived risk or their level of 
preparedness is likely to occur’. Individuals not only transferred risk to other 
members of their community, but also to agencies responsible for DRM 
(Paton et al., 2008). Ironically, but also somewhat worryingly, the more 
campaigns there were about safety, the less people felt they needed to act. 
This finding has been termed ‘risk compensation’ (Paton et al., 2008:182).
Many of the findings discussed above in relation to the role of emotions 
and unrealistic optimism refer in some way to previous experience. This is 
the focus on the next section. 
2.3. Previous experience
Previous experience is often assumed to be a trigger for behavioural 
change, particularly in relation to better preparedness. Empirical research 
however demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case and that the 
findings are mixed and often contradictory. 
There is empirical evidence to suggest that previous experience does not 
necessarily lead to increased preparedness. Some of the possible reasons 
for this have been mentioned above, such as territorial functioning, 
ontological security, memory bias and unrealistic optimism. Another 
possible reason for this is that as humans we are not particularly good at 
what is described as ‘evaluability’ (see Siegrist and Gutscher, 2008: 772). 
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This is our ability to effectively evaluate the affect of a natural hazard. 
For example, because of the tendency of media coverage to focus on 
quantifying financial losses as a result of disasters, there is less awareness 
of the emotional consequences of a disaster. Those not directly affected 
by disasters are less likely to recall the negative emotional aspects of the 
experience of others and thus inaccurately evaluate the possible impacts if 
they were to be affected. Indeed, Siegrist and Gutscher (2008: 771) found 
that it is not only difficult for individuals to effectively imagine what being 
affected by a disaster might be like, but most individuals in fact strongly 
underestimated the likely negative affect.
In contrast, there is a substantial amount of empirical research in other 
contexts and hazards which demonstrates that previous experience is 
a significant factor in preparedness. As an example, research into rural 
farming communities’ preparedness for wildfires and grassfires in Victoria, 
Australia, reveal that there is not only a high understanding of the hazard 
but also high preparedness (McGee and Russel, 2003). Previous experience 
was one of the most important factors attributed to motivating better 
preparedness, but experience alone was not enough; it was tied into 
the practice of dealing with fires as part of a farming community. Learnt 
preparedness measures such as farmers’ own knowledge of burning 
off fields were passed on through generations. This is what Jakes et al. 
(2003, in McGee and Russell, 2003: 10) refers to as ‘cultural capital’ which 
emphasises ‘...the importance of agricultural heritage, experience and 
longevity in the community in fostering preparedness’. Moreover, the 
families that were most prepared were those who had lived in the area for 
an extended period of time, established links with the local fire brigade, 
and developed strong social cohesion though farmer networks. 
Unlike many communities around the world which face hazards, the rural 
communities in Victoria often face the choice of whether to stay and 
defend their properties or whether to evacuate. The majority of families 
in McGee and Russell’s research (2003: 10) frequently decided to stay and 
protect their property, were considerably confident and capable of doing 
so, and accepted responsibility for wildfire preparedness as part of their 
farming role. Before moving on to consider some of the implications of the 
findings related to emotions, unrealistic optimism and previous experience 
to DRM, the paper first considers some methodological limitations of the 
literature. 
2.4. A note on methodology
Despite being a somewhat obvious statement, there must be appropriate 
recognition of the methodological criticisms of research studies. This 
is particularly important when drawing heavily on disciplines that 
use different research methods to those disaster risk managers are 
familiar with. One of the most fundamental limitations of a number of 
the aforementioned research studies is their use of decision-making 
models which ‘...presume that individuals under severe stress can think 
rationally’ (Riad et al., 1999: 932). It seems somewhat ironic that many of 
these models fail to take account of the so-called ‘defective information 
processing’ which happens under severe stress of a disaster. The failure 
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to accommodate for so-called ‘non-rational’ responses even meant that 
Raid et al. (1999: 932) were unable to categorise many of the respondent 
answers because they did not fit into the rational decision-making 
perspective. 
Other methodological critiques that need to be considered relate to 
attempts to categorise individuals. As Chauvin, Hermand and Mullet 
(2007: 171-172) note, ‘...characterizing individuals is much more complex 
than characterizing hazards, especially since individual variability is 
considerable’. That said, the challenge is not simply one of finding a way 
to effectively categorise individuals. Even if this were possible, which 
some would argue it is not, we would be limited by the categorisations of 
our current worldviews. The categories that are currently used to try and 
categorise, order and re-organise individuals say just as much about the 
researcher and their cultural context as they do of those that are the focus 
of study. The more fundamental questions regarding the way in which we 
understand the world to be constructed and how we believe the world can 
be studied notwithstanding, this raises practical problems regarding the 
comparability of research. As Chauvin, Hermand and Mullet (2007: 172) 
correctly point out, ‘..the personal dimensions considered varied widely 
from one study to the other, mainly as a function of the authors’ preference 
and choices’. As the author of this paper found, the ability to make 
comparisons between research studies is limited because of the difference 
between the socio-psychological aspects being studied.
Another challenge is the method chosen by some researchers seeking to 
apply psychological theories. Take for example the Sattler et al. (2000) 
study. Questionnaires were used with a group of respondents with a mix 
of demographic backgrounds, although as the authors acknowledge the 
group was not necessarily representative of those affected by hurricanes. 
Moreover, the majority did not own their own home. Given the influence 
that ownership of property makes on preparedness and evacuation, 
as suggested by Riad et al.’s (1999) work on territorial functioning, this 
somewhat limits the applicability of the findings to other groups. 
Harries’ study (2008)  also raises important questions about not only the 
method of study being employed to address the role of emotions within 
disaster preparedness, but the very framing of risk by many researchers. 
Firstly, the use of methods that take people’s responses at face value have 
limitations for exploring emotions: ‘As emotions are primary to rational 
thought and do not necessarily enter consciousness, this implies the need 
or a methodological shift towards research methods that look beneath the 
superficial meanings of what people say and explore the representations 
and discourses that shape their speech and actions’ (Harries, 2008: 23). 
Secondly, there remains the predominance of the notion that lay people 
have a distorted perception of risk because of their failure to take heed of 
expert advice on preparedness. As Harries (2008: 6) points out, the validity 
of this assumption is called into question with a greater consideration of 
the role of emotions and the social construction of people’s understandings 
of disasters.
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3. What are the implications for disaster risk  
     management? 
Many of the concepts discussed in this paper, such as unrealistic optimism, 
territorial functioning, memory bias and evaluability, offer the potential to 
better understand why some of the seemingly well thought out and best 
intended DRM interventions fail to have the desired effect or result in the 
opposite behaviour to that intended. This raises important questions about 
the need to re-think the way we undertake DRM. As an initial contribution, 
outlined below are some of the implications that need to be considered 
within DRM programmes and policies.
a    Questions were raised about the assumptions within research that fails 
to explore the relevance of time lags between people’s experiences 
of a disaster and subsequent preparedness. There is a tendency for 
people who have previously experienced a disaster to be categorised 
into a single group and treated as though they would all behave in a 
similar manner, by virtue of their experience. The findings of Sattler et 
al.’s (2000) work on hurricanes in Charleston indicated that this is not 
necessarily the case and in fact the longer the period of time between 
experiences the more lax individuals’ preparedness activities become. 
A possible way to counter this is to ensure preparedness campaigns 
take place while memories of disasters are close enough to be recalled 
accurately (yet within a sensitive time frame) to avoid memory bias. 
Alternatively, remembrance campaigns could be initiated to ensure 
preparedness is maintained long after a disaster event and to overcome 
the complacency, as found in Charleston, by challenging memory bias. 
b.   Another implication for disaster risk practitioners and policy makers 
is to avoid the complacency that may develop when communities are 
seemingly well prepared for disasters or have a proven track record 
of managing disaster impacts effectively. For example, McGee and 
Russel (2003) found that despite the Victoria communities having 
strong capacity and capability to deal with wildfires and grass fires, 
the authorities responsible for DRM need to be cognisant of the 
changing demographics within the communities. Researchers found 
that newcomers as well as an ageing population meant that emergency 
managers should not assume communities do in fact know how 
to protect themselves and are taking the necessary precautionary 
measures (McGee and Russel, 2003: 11). DRM interventions should 
therefore seek to take special measures to account for the fact that 
newcomers will not have the same level of territorial functioning or 
historical experience with wildfires and grassfires, nor the networks or 
established relationships with the fire service, that were found to be 
so significant to existing communities’ capacity to deal with disasters. 
The need to avoid complacency is particularly important in the face 
of climate change where new and unexpected scenarios may exceed 
communities’ capacity to cope with disaster risk. 
c.    Both examples above point to the need for communities to be more 
(or continually) informed about climate and disaster risk, but current 
practices for communicating risk reduction have vast potential to be 
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improved, as highlighted by the research on flooding in Switzerland. 
The findings showed that people who experience flooding are more 
likely to take preventative action against future risks because of their 
ability to remember negative emotions associated with the experience. 
The implication for DRM strategies is that ‘The challenge of risk 
communication lies not so much in providing rational information 
but in adequately addressing the experiential system’ (Siegrist and 
Gutscher, 2008: 777). Siegrist and Gutscher (2008: 771) suggest that 
risk reduction must move beyond a focus on the technical aspects 
of flooding to include triggers for motivating mitigation behaviour, 
which in this case are the negative emotional consequences of natural 
disasters. This poses a challenging question for disaster risk managers: 
‘Can there be a substitute for direct, personal experience?’ (Siegrist 
and Gutscher, 2008: 777). Or, indeed, is it appropriate to frame DRM 
interventions in negative terms? At what point would this become 
a scare tactic and what are the ethical implications of that? Recent 
government broadcasts by the UK Government aimed at promoting 
action on climate change have been criticised for adopting such as scare 
tactic, with images showing flooding causing dramatic loss of livelihoods 
and property (Whitmarsh, 2011). 
d.   Research into the lack of preparedness by communities at risk of 
volcanic eruption in Auckland challenged the current trend for public 
education programmes that require the audience to passively receive 
information. Paton et al. (2008) thus highlighted the importance of 
improving campaigns aimed at promoting disaster risk preparedness 
by: i) paying more attention to the quality of relationships between 
individuals and civil agencies, with emphasis on linking personal, social 
and civic factors affecting behaviour; and ii) encouraging proactive 
participation and dialogue as a means to convey the need to take 
preventative action. There is a tendency for DRM, and climate change 
awareness raising campaigns more generally, to distribute information 
that has been largely determined by agencies external to a community 
(even if the intermediary is from the community or region) as 
exemplified by the toolkits, manuals and training programmes offered. 
This reduces the space available for dialogue, exchange and most 
crucially learning on the part of the risk reduction agencies about the 
factors that influence individuals’ risk behaviour. 
The implications raised in this section have relevance beyond the examples 
they emerged from and require consideration and application in other 
contexts in order to have broader relevance. As hinted in point d. above, 
there are also implications that present more fundamental challenges to 
the way DRM currently operates. This is the focus of the conclusion: there 
are limitations to making small shifts in the way we currently work when 
the framing of risk being employed within DRM is external to the recipient 
communities. 
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4. Conclusion
This paper has sought to bring to the fore a number of concepts that 
are not conventionally incorporated into mainstream DRM policies and 
programmes but which offer the potential to advance DRM thinking 
and practice to better support the lives and livelihoods of those affected 
by climate and disaster risk. In working through these concepts, more 
fundamental challenges have emerged that raise questions about the 
assumptions underlying current DRM. In this concluding section two 
tensions that emerged through the paper are discussed. First, DRM 
agencies (and subsequently their interventions) hold different conceptions 
of risk and different risk priorities in comparison to the recipient 
communities. Second, the problematic assumption that, with sufficient 
knowledge and capacity, people will behave in ways DRM programmes 
intend.
The differences between conceptions of risk and risk priorities between 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Cannon, 2008) are not always taken into account 
for the following reasons: 
• Lack of space to appreciate these differences. For example, the aid 
system largely requires interventions to be predetermined in advance  
of substantive work within communities.
• Programme priorities may be determined by headquarters far from the 
intervention site. 
• Poor outcomes to an intervention caused by an inherent tension 
between external agencies and communities’ priorities, which results  
in poor uptake or buy-in from the community. Often this is interpreted 
as challenges of programme implementation. 
• Differing priorities are overlooked by agencies with specialised terms, 
tools and experience. Agencies regard themselves as knowing best 
what would benefit a community and try and change behaviour or risk 
priorities regardless of local knowledge.
The story is not as negative as this list implies. Indeed, the tensions that 
different risk priorities present to disaster risk programmes are commonly 
recognised by disaster risk managers. The challenge lies in changing 
the institutional culture to openly recognise such tensions and support 
dialogue to identify ways for them to be overcome. For example, there are 
instances where DRM programmes have intended to implement activities 
to address one type of risk but have changed the focus of their programmes 
to something quite different to better reflect the recipient communities’ 
priorities. However such examples are few and far between.
The assumption that ‘better DRM’ is the answer and that with sufficient 
knowledge and capacity people will behave in ways that DRM programmes 
intend, fails to adequately critique the underlying assumptions of current 
DRM practice. This is not a new idea. Many authors have noted that people 
knowingly live in areas ‘at risk’ and exercise substantial choice in doing so 
(Cannon, 2008: 351). This poses a number of problems for disaster risk 
managers. Most critically, it calls into question the implicit and underlying 
logic of DRM interventions which assume that people would, given 
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sufficient knowledge and awareness, not knowingly live in areas deemed 
as ‘risky’. The implications of this for DRM practitioners are inherently 
problematic. As Cannon (2008: 355) notes, ‘...improving their [vulnerable 
communities] security means persuading people to act against what they 
think are their own interests, or denying their culture or psychological 
preferences’. The use of the term ‘bounded rationality’ is useful here, when 
applied to the DRM sector. Schipper and Dekens (2009: 1) explain that ‘...
people have bounded rationality; that is, people’s rationality is limited to 
their own information, beliefs and (economic) tradeoffs’. This term is useful 
for thinking not only about the role of culture in determining communities’ 
choices, behaviour and preferences, as Shipper and Dekens (2009) use the 
term, but in turning a critical lens to the DRM sector: we employ our own 
bounded rationality when seeking to enact DRM interventions, which often 
do not align with the rationality of the people we are trying to help. Some 
of the concepts explored in this paper provide ways to better understand 
why seemingly well thought out DRM interventions have not had the 
desired effect. For continued development of the DRM sector we need to 
become more self-reflexive and take seriously the social and psychological 
dimensions of our own and others’ behaviour.
Further research is required to investigate the significance of cultural 
differences in the way communities in hazard-prone regions interpret 
disaster and climate risk. A nuanced understanding of the implications and 
challenges as well as opportunities this presents would make a significant 
contribution to current debates. Specifically, future research directions 
could include an exploration of how some of the issues raised within this 
paper affect disaster preparedness. For example:
 
• What factors encourage some individuals to transfer risk (risk 
compensation), while others accept responsibility? 
• What factors influence memory bias and thus individuals’ motivations 
to prepare for disasters?
• How do different cultural interpretations of disasters affect so-called 
unrealistic optimism?
• Why may some individuals be more likely to become ‘inoculated’ by 
their previous experiences?
• What provokes some individuals to enact territorial functioning and not 
others?
• How can we improve our evaluability to encourage more action on 
climate and disaster risk reduction?
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